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The Place of Values



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The Place of Values

AN ESSAY IN
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS



BY

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INTRODUCTION.



THE two words worth and truth seem to be independent variables. Although we believe them to be related in some way, they are not, at least, synonymous in our minds. Our question is: What relation or articulation is there between values and truth? Hence we have our subject, The Place of Values. By way of a general introduction we shall inquire why the subject of values has been neglected in philosophy and why it is important. Then, as a historical introduction, we shall briefly glance at attempts to supplement intellectualism, finding them, I think, to be really attempts to do justice to the worth side of life. Our main question we will approach from the epistemological standpoint, asking what are the elements in consciousness and what is the significance of the analysis into subject and object. As an irreducible element in consciousness—in the content of the word subject where the antithesis subject-object is used—and in the counterpart to the abstract relationships which are best represented by the word truth, we shall find, I believe, the place of values.

Why Values Have Been Neglected.

The exclusion of values from the domain of truth was achieved only after a long struggle. Arguments of expediency and utility had so hampered the quest of truth and truth was so much more effective when free from them that even ethics, which the Greeks had founded on the

conception of the good (Prof. Ladd's Phil. of Conduct, Page 34) sought its basis in something less variable than values and developed into a system of truths. In fact truth seemed to offer itself as the last hope of minds looking for an authority. So variable an element as value could contribute nothing to those satisfied with absoluteness alone, and when truth seemed able to interpret the whole of experience in its own terms it was supposed that values also would some day be expressible in terms of truth. Furthermore the dictum *de gustibus non disputandum est* precluded any attempt to treat values scientifically. Political Economy, whose investigations lie largely in the realm of values, as quickly as possible reduced values to mere numbers, to the dollars and cents which the buyer is willing to pay (Commercial theory of values) or to the amount of toil and sacrifice which a thing has cost the seller (Socialist theory. Pres Hadley, Economics, Page 91).

Theology used to furnish an opportunity for the discussion of values. But Theology has been pushed to the wall and Philosophy of Religion, which has been substituted for it, points out origins and relations and unities rather than values.

The net result is that values have been painstakingly eliminated from all sciences and have not come to their own anywhere else.

Why a Treatment of Values is Important.

It is important——

First, because although truth for truth's sake is a motto which we would not reject for a moment, there is this value element in our life, the most intense element, the most personal. It includes all that men most desire, and it cries for recognition and justification; or else, if it be a fiction and a fallacy, then an entire removal because it disturbs and perverts the recognition of truth. Men fight against determinism because the value of their living is menaced. Men opposed evolution because it

seemed to take away the value in their existence. We must either justify or eliminate the sense of values.

Second, It is very well for the truth-seeker to be calm and patient and not to worry even should another thousand years pass before the value of existence be worked out. Men and women, however, have but a few years to live. To-day they must act, and the question of ultimate values demands immediate treatment. It cannot be postponed. Thinkers have neglected to link our every day interests to their systems. Our conduct will not wait on their success in attaining reality ;

Third, The pessimistic conclusions of some of our most influential thinkers, even though we feel the morbidity of their views, are an additional incentive to us to discuss values and their place in our thinking ;

Fourth, Perhaps in this element of values which plays the leading part in our life, we shall find the clue to some of our philosophical and psychological difficulties.

Professor Ladd does not at all overstate the case when he says : (Phil. of Conduct, Page 195.) "The reconciliation of man's scientific standards and his judgments of that which has value, is the imperative and most difficult problem of this age beyond all other ages." In itself the very fact that philosophy has found no place for values, justifies the imperative demand for their treatment.

SUPPLEMENTS TO INTELLECTUALISM.

Religion as a Supplement.

We take up the supplements to intellectualism as a historical introduction to our subject because we regard them as indirect recognitions of the importance and the place of values. Among the various supplements to intellectualism we find that religion has always furnished the principal practical supplement. Its contents are made up of what people desire and of that which appeals to people. Its sincerest devotees are little affected by verdicts of intellectualism. It is the scandal to scientific minds that exhorters and evangelists make no appeal to

logic in winning adherents and even condemn speculation as distracting the attention from that which is more important.

In the Christian religion for instance, for the practical propagation of the "Gospel," the chief emphasis has been laid on such things as the sense of sin, and the attractive power of Christ, things which appeal to the sense of worth. It is in the wake of the movement and not ahead of it that there has arisen the discussion as to the personality of Christ and the logical meaning of the atonement. The basis of religion was never in intellectualism, although the latter is always very ready to take it up and explain what its basis is. Natural Theology tried to rebase it on reasoning. Modern Philosophy of Religion where it does not tread in the path of Natural Theology studies it as a phenomenon among other phenomena to be accounted for. Neither Natural Theology nor the Philosophy of Religion have propagated religion.

Faith as a Supplement.

These supplementary movements have always gone along parallel with intellectualism, in different periods taking on different names. One which has had the widest range centers in the word faith. Sometimes the word has set the heart with its affections over against the mind with its knowledge. This has been derisively called the Pectoral Theology or theology of the breast. Sometimes inner experience has been set over against outer experience, insights and intuitions over against reasoning. For instance Otto Pfleiderer, recognized as the leading German follower of Hegel, says: "Religion does not attempt to explain the world theoretically, but it tries to set right the relation to the world of the feeling and willing ego or the heart." (Relig. Phil. 2-651).

Sometimes faith is a peculiar sense of dependence on the world-ruling might "in whose hand lies our weal and woe." We may call attention to the fact that in such statements the important element is not in the "dependence" but in the words "weal and woe."

Some assert that faith is a special revelation or a special insight vouchsafed to the elect. Some find a basis for faith in authority, whether the authority of the Vicar of God, or the authority of the church or that of common experience. Some call faith an "attitude of the mind" favorable to the apprehension of truth, or a mystic knowledge or intimation of the supernatural. Faith is often openly named "belief without reason or against reason," or else reason is discredited in the hope that this something else, namely faith, will advance in credit. Sometimes it is shown that all knowledge has "faith elements" and therefore the particular faith, which is being advocated, is true! A recent popular form of the faith doctrine has been found in James' "Will to Believe," while in Theological circles Luther's associating faith with that which man clings to and trusts to is finding wide acceptance.

Jowett, who may be taken as representing the Theology of Feeling, says: "Logical categories may give as false a notion of the divine nature in our age as graven images did in the age of the Patriarchs." In every use of the word faith there is an attempt to fill up a void left by truth.

Practical Philosophy.

Of a less distinctly religious character is the distinction between Practical and Theoretical Philosophy. Kant made the Practical Philosophy a code of conduct. In recent times there has been quite a tendency to find it as a system of worths. Wundt says in his *Einleitung*, (Page 7): "When we ask for the object of Philosophy, we find two objects; one, theoretical, purely intellectual, which has its roots in the struggle of our reason for a unity and harmony in knowledge; and the other, practical, which belongs to the feeling side (*Gemüthsseite*) of our soul life and seeks for a world-view which shall satisfy our subjective desires." We may by anticipation mention the inherent contradiction in Wundt's system found in the fact that he reduces Practical Philosophy to

Theoretical (Einleitung, Page 38) but in epistemology he reduces the object to the subject.

One phase of the Practical Philosophy is to emphasize "what ought to be" as against "what is." Sidgwick, for instance, ("Phil., its Scope and Relations," Page 94) sets off, first the ethico-political system of what ought to be, and over against this he puts the science, or the positive system of what is. He defines Theology as concerned with showing the relation between the two.

The Spirit-Sciences.

In certain philosophical circles, especially in Germany, the whole of the old contention in behalf of Theology, of faith, and of the Practical Philosophy, is gathered together under the term "Spirit Sciences" which is set over against "Nature Sciences." The names usually associated with this movement are those of Rickert, who preferred the phrase culture-sciences, Windelband, Dilthey, Wundt, and Münsterberg. Dilthey says in his *Einl. in die Geistes-wissenschaften*, Page 33: "The Spirit sciences are made up of three classes of propositions—fact, theorem, and value-judgment. From the first root in consciousness, however, up to the highest point, is the nexus of value judgments and imperatives independent from the first two classes of fact and uniformity."

Windelband seems to have been led to make this distinction through a revolt against the carrying of nature science methods over into history. When history is read in terms of cause-effect relations, it becomes mechanical and the meaning of events is either removed or postponed indefinitely. Carlyle's method of setting forth each event and man to appeal to us, was felt to be closer to experience. As other attempts to supplement intellectualism may be mentioned the value-judgments of the Ritschlians, also Ethical Idealism directed against the Neo-Hegelians and Ethical Monism directed against the Scientific Monism.

The Worth of Life.

These references to supplements to intellectualism are sufficient to establish the fact stated by Wundt in his *Einleitung* that "along with the conception of Philosophy as a theoretic discipline there have ever been conceptions of it as *Güterlehre*—both elements have been recognized in the great systems."

Out of the great mass of experience we find separating two points of view, one formal, with constantly increasing success in shaking itself free from values, the other practical realizing ever more and more that the question of worths and values is its nucleus. The ultimate type of the former is the purely formal science of mathematics where two plus two equals four, no matter whether the two stands for atoms, or men, or dollars. Its goal is to express experience, as far as possible in these formal terms. Mechanics and physics are to be reduced as far as possible to mathematical terms, chemistry to mechanics; biology and physiology to chemistry; and psychology to physiology, and thus ultimately to mathematics.

Along with this very legitimate ambition is the desire to do justice to the worth in life and all the various attempts to supplement intellectualism, each using a different vocabulary, have their root and their justification in their recognition of values. It is in the extent that they attain this recognition without doing violence to the first tendency, that they obtain our sympathy and that they have an influence.

A careful examination of these supplements will, I think, substantiate this last statement. Though they seem so divergent in their aims and though what they actually attain seems often so far removed from the idea of worths yet worths is their main motive, and when they swing away from that motive interest in them is gone.

As illustrating such loss of interest, contrast for instance the difference in the force of the appeal made to men by Philosophy's God and the Christ of Christianity. The former, the Absolute, the God who possesses the at-

tributes of omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence does not stir any one who is not already under religious impulse derived elsewhere. Christianity has had to depend on the worth for society of the personality of Christ for its propagation and not on the arguments of Theism. Christ has been received as a worth, Philosophy's God as a truth. In contrasting the influence of the two, as representing worth and truth, it is enlightening to note further that not a single attribute of the God of Philosophy is to be found in Christ and not one of Christ's attributes is to be found in Philosophy's God. No wonder that it is difficult for a "Natural Theologian" to say that Christ was the Son of God. For he was not the son of Philosophy's God, but in his life of love he revealed the fact that there is something worth while in existence. His revelation was of love, of worth and not of power or of a cause, or of an absolute, and herein has lain its influence. To love your neighbor means to feel the worth of your neighbor. To love God means to feel a worth in life above your life. To love self means to feel the worth of self. Love is a sufficient characterization of God. God is love means that God is what is worth while in existence. Only out of the idea of worth can be built up his personality, as, I think, will appear later. The worth, the value in existence is God. Therefore Christians are able to insist that only he has begun to have a right conception of God who can say that Christ was his son, because Christ's life was the life of the highest worth; that is, the highest incarnation of worth which we have had. The message of Christianity to a pleasure-loving age, to an indifferent age, to an age of pessimism, is simple but all important: "There is a worth in existence, and that worth is to be found in the life and death of Christ."

If before deciding whether there is any worth in existence we wait for reasoning to prove it, "no worth" will be our verdict. Reasoning can only manipulate what has already been given it. The syllogism does not add to the contents of the major premise. Hence pessimism or no worth is the goal of intellectualism.

Wherever we look, at Religion or Practical Philosophy or at the Geistes-wissenschaften, we shall find that the worth in life is the distinguishing postulate of the supplements to intellectualism. Our interest in immortality and the repeated defences of it do not arise out of a desire to go on living forever like an indestructible atom but they are the result of the natural repulsion against the loss of value. The proof of immortality does not establish the value in our life but the fact of the latter is the basis for any expectation of immortality. Again from the scientific point of view, we should exult over the success in introducing necessity into the realm of motives. In fact, however, we rebel against determinism, and this is because it takes away any meaning in our conduct.

In laying this emphasis on the worth side of experience as a counterpart to the truth side, it is not our intention to enter into the epistemological analysis which follows, prejudiced. But it is legitimate, when there are such an indefinite number of bases for a classification of the facts of consciousness to use, as a hypothesis, the clue furnished by a cleavage in the whole of experience, a cleavage which may perhaps have its foundation in the very elements of consciousness. When we take up the analysis of consciousness with a previous notion of that for which we are looking, there is a risk that we may be on the wrong track and that we shall be misled. There is, however, when we enter such a maze, the increased probability of picking up the right clue when we have an idea of what it is. This introduction, therefore, which has indicated I hope the deep hold upon us of the world of worths, far from vitiating the analysis to which we are about to proceed, is the only thing which prevents me from feeling presumptuous in pitting the results here reached against those of profounder and more experienced psychologists. Feeling assured that there is a meaning, a worth in existence, and being driven back from trying to find this worth in an over-man, or in a future age, or in a social organism, to the individual consciousness as the ultimate basis for such an assurance, we approached

the investigation with the certainty of finding a definite element there—not so unscientific an approach as some might think. I am convinced that no worth in existence and no purpose in existence into which the time element enters as a constituent part, as, for instance, with the evolutionists, has yet been validly based: It is for this reason that I would reject the teleological argument as unable to establish a worth.

The most pressing problem in Philosophy is to articulate practical Philosophy with theoretical Philosophy, worth with truth. This is an epistemological problem, if we are permitted to extend the word epistemology to include the whole analysis of consciousness. Just as the question “what is true?” became the question “what is truth?” so the question what is of value has become, what is value? Is there value? Consciousness is the final court in the former case and must be likewise the final court in the latter case, for as we have said if value be not postulated in the premise it can never be argued into the conclusion. The element of value is as fundamental as the notion of existence.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.

Consciousness the Ultimate Point of Departure.

In every day language experience is spoken of as the ultimate point of departure; we may say, moreover, that psychologists are agreed in taking consciousness as the ultimate point of departure for experience, consciousness and experience being, as I think will be clear later, the same thing looked at in different relations.

There are not wanting great names of philosophers who use elements which they do not feel obliged to trace back to consciousness. But it seems safe to say that whenever the elements of experience, even of will or intuition or “Stellungnehmen,” may have originated, they are, in some way, in consciousness now, and since we cannot talk about them except in relation to consciousness our investigation must hold to its terminology.

More difficult to convince than such philosophers are those scientists who attempt to tell what the world was before consciousness evolved. To the psychologists the argument seems simple: All the terms which the evolutionist uses—heat, weight, pressure, dust, energy—are present to the consciousness and have a meaning as terms only to consciousness; in and out of conscious experience (really a tautological phrase) has been evolved the world as each one knows it; even the expression, “unconscious thought,” has to be established out of the elements in consciousness and though the evolutionist talks confidently of the evolving consciousness, his supposedly independent world must be likewise established out of elements in consciousness. Perhaps the scientist would be more open to persuasion if we should assure him that this position does not necessarily sublimate the reality of the world in which he is interested.

The Analysis of Consciousness.

With the natural analysis of consciousness into different states we are all familiar. From it have come the different senses, the different qualities, the different feelings, the different emotions, the different desires, etc. It is very valuable for Psychology. In epistemology, however, we would try to go a little further and analyze each state. This will perhaps restore to consciousness that unity which the analysis into states seems to take away.

The popular analysis into intellect, sensibility and will, when not understood as an ontological rending asunder, is an attempt more in our direction. It has proved very helpful and we ought not to let go of it entirely. It throws some light but not enough, and in itself has led to confusion, because intellection contains both sensibility and will, and so each in turn contains the other two.

For a first step there seems to be a way less accidental, viz. : to separate out one element if possible and put provisionally what is left under a second name.

Subject and Object.

Such terms will contain just as much meaning as we put into them. We will put into them that meaning which gives comprehensibility to the greatest number of phenomena. The importance of the terms and of the analysis will depend on our success in finding a basis of differentiation which will do justice to the greatest number of facts. Therefore we might set off X and Y and find out what content can be given an X as against a content for Y. We have the right, however, as a hypothesis to take a hint from one of the most striking differences which we expect to bring into line namely the distinction between the I and the not-I. That distinction, however, may not be a fundamental one and we must still be careful to put into the words we may adopt only such a content as experience allows us. Epistemology long ago attempted a two-fold analysis and has set over against each other the two words subject and object, borrowed from logic.

It is well to use these words because each points to the other, and if we hold fast to them we shall not be led into trying to define consciousness as a whole (our point of departure) in terms of one of the elements found in it. There is no object without a subject and no subject without an object. The separation accordingly is not ontological, nor is there any absolute division. Whatever elements we may find, there must be a reference in them, expressed or implied, to the rest of the elements.

Any one, therefore, who speaks of unconscious will thereby proclaims that he did not obtain his conception of will out of the analysis of consciousness; he has divided the faculties.

For our reciprocal terms we might have used internal and external save that this almost unavoidably leads to what Avenarius has called "interjection," or we might have used center and circumference, save that technically the center is an infinitely small point and when used for the subject it becomes difficult to give a content to a van-

ishing point. We can also see that if emptied of most of their contents save that of reciprocity we might have used the words antecedent and consequent, or up and down, or numerator and denominator, etc. All these possibilities are mentioned to show how colorless must be the words subject and object to start with, because many of the difficulties in Epistemology have been artificial, caused by trying to press an analogy or metaphor.

Pressing Analogies.

In the use of the words subject and object, for instance, the pressing of logical analogies has been a remarkable source of confusion. Some going so far as to say that the subject can never be investigated, because when examined it at once becomes an object and thus loses its subjective character. Brentano speaks first of the object which is conceived, judged and desired; second, the act of conceiving, judging or desiring; but the third, the subject, is beyond his ken. Bradley also makes the predicate or object an adjective: only the subject is real. These are forcing of analogies quite as much as is the reducing of the subject as a center to a vanishing point, or the similar picture, where the subject is regarded as the small end of a cornucopia, with the object as the large end so that attempts to examine the subject are compared to the wish of the eye to see itself.

Some seem to picture the ego as a planet upon which the consciousness moves, thinking at first that up and down is a fundamental relation in things till a higher astronomy resolves the difference into one of direction. Now this as an analogy is well enough, but is not sufficient for the basis of a system.

In regard to the grammatical analogy mentioned above and the assertion that the subject can never be examined because it at once becomes the object (in a sentence) it should be remembered that it is not the subject alone, as they seem to think, which is examining, but the as yet undifferentiated subject-object, that is, the present state of consciousness which is analyzing a past. If grammar

prevents the previous subject's being examined so does it prevent the present "object's" pretending to examine. It is as possible for the present subject-object to examine the previous subject as to examine the previous object. Its affirmations about the object are quite as open to question as those about the subject. In these and similar paralogsms the word subject is used in a metaphysical sense and no longer in an epistemological sense.


Probably our speaking as though the present state examined the past introduces an artificial difficulty. A state of consciousness is not an object held up to view, and the lines we introduce divide up experience as little as the equator bothers the earth. Pure experience knows no distinction as that between a subject-object first not opened up and then cracked open like a nut. Perhaps a higher knowledge may show a subject-object in other relations. For our consciousness, which is the inside of the nut, there are only the elements which appear, in one respect, as subject and object. We shall deal with it according to our light and not press a figure as though we could stand outside of consciousness. It will not do to let the epistemological subject which is an element in consciousness be supplanted by a very different metaphysical subject which includes both subject and object.

The pressing of the grammatical analogy and this view of the ego as something standing outside of consciousness, or a something of which the consciousness is a functioning, will come up again when we come to speak of those who put the will for the subject. Let it be understood that the objection is not to the use of analogies, because all description must be in analogies, but the use must be justified by experience and the analogy must not be used as a proof.

Reciprocity in Analysis.

With the clue that apparently the principal fact to be accounted for is the distinction between the ego and non-ego, we start with the two words subject and object which have so far merely the element of reciprocity. The figure

which best represents this reciprocity is that used in mathematics when a plane is analyzed into the X and Y co-ordinates.




This figure shows that there is no experience, or reality, or consciousness which does not contain both subject and object. Each is a supplement to the other, and it takes both to restore the experience, or reality, or consciousness. Since we expect to take the above diagram as the type of our analysis, it may not be out of place to point out that it is the type of all analysis. It is misleading to picture an analysis as dividing into two independent parts. An inseparable element in each part is always its relation to the other part. When water is analyzed into oxygen and hydrogen an inalienable part of the reality of each is its relation to the other, and the same diagram must be used to express the reciprocity. An analysis is never ontological.



The diagram shows the unity, but yet does justice to the difference. The diagram does not explain anything.

It does not solve the problem of like and unlike, or unity and plurality, but it gives a picture and makes graspable what might otherwise present insurmountable difficulties to our thinking. Some of these difficulties which otherwise threaten to block the way are bridged over, and we are able to proceed with our investigation.



For instance, intellection and feeling are shown to be, by experience, independent variables, yet there is no intellection without feeling and no feeling without intellection. Now without stopping to war over the question as to which is to be reduced to the other we make a picture of their identity and difference and are able to go on.

Artificiality of the Analysis Into Subject and Object

There have been some criticisms of the analysis into subject and object on the ground that it was artificial; that it is not the one which would naturally occur to an unpsychological mind. It has been asserted that any analysis which claims to be primitive and fundamental must be a natural one, one that might be present to a very elementary consciousness. We answer that all classifications and categories are hypotheses which survive out of the whole of experience after a struggle with competing hypotheses. They depend for their importance and reality on being the result of a wide range of experience. Provided that they are applicable to the particular cases, the wideness of their applicability enhances

rather than diminishes their reality. Our analysis into subject and object therefore must account for the elements of elementary consciousnesses, but we could not at all expect it to occur to them. Truth is organic and not inorganic. It grows not by accretion but by evolution. We can not lay down a bit of truth like a bit of a pyramid and expect to find it in the larger truth. The larger truth though including all the facts may entirely exclude the lesser truth.

VARIOUS CONTENTS FOR SUBJECT AND OBJECT

For the words subject and object, the content with which we start out is reciprocity; and our clue of ego and non-ego we are ready to abandon for a better one as soon as the facts require it. The use of the words, however, is not new, and it will help us to have in mind the different meanings that have been put into them.

The Spinozistic Philosophy put thought for one and extension for the other leading to an insurmountable dualism. Kant put for the subject that which gave the form and for the object that which gave the content, thus requiring a "Ding an sich" on each side. His successors sublimated the latter "Ding an sich", the materialists the former, the Neo-Kantians both, which was a step in the right direction. The Realists tried to resolve the two into a higher unity, as, for instance, the Identity Philosophy or some of the advocates of the Will Philosophy.

A very modern system which has already been hinted at, is that which defines the subject as a Center-factor (Zentralglied) and the object as the Reacting-factor (Gegenglied). Compare the picture of our planet moving among the other heavenly bodies where each one in turn may be regarded as the center of the universe around which all the rest move. This position expounded by Külpe ("Das Ich und die Aussenwelt." Phil. Studien '92) is a development of the Empirio-Critical position and in its overcoming the cornucopia psychology and the inner-and-outer Philosophy has been of great value. Furthermore, as a picture it provides a very good monistic

basis. All of experience is reduced to a sort of network where each Gegenglied is also a Zentralglied. A tree is a Gegenglied for me but I am also a Gegenglied for it.

We reject it as insufficient because there is no difference except of direction between subject and object, and no further meaning can be put into the picture. Each object is a subject. It reduces the distinction to a point of view and is not properly an analysis.

This is a good instance of making a system of an analogy. Monism is obtained by eliminating instead of harmonizing differences. The analogy is good, but not enough to solve our problems. To really grapple with the facts of experience, we must differentiate the subject from the object by more than a geometric direction. The subject is more than a center of concepts.

Besides all this, if we regard our consciousness, as Münsterberg says, with our eyes closed, we shall find no Zentralglied but all Gegenglieds, and we have been again confusing a Philosophical subject with an Epistemological one. Perhaps the Epistemological subject is not a "Glied" at all.

The limitations of this system come, I believe, from its having originated out of a polemic against those who put inner experience for the subject and outer experience for the object. This last position has a historical interest but no Epistemological basis, and we may pass it over, coming to the Psychology most accepted by us in America.

The Subject as Will.

Here the analysis into subject and object is accepted and as the content of the subject is put will, for the object is put whatever else there is in consciousness, sometimes the feeling being absorbed into the will in some way or else everything apparently being thrown to the side of the object.

This division of the faculties of the mind into will and intellection is the classical one and prevailed in England till the coming in of Kantian influence. Practical con-

duct and Ethics gave will; Logic and concepts gave intellect. It was perhaps Rousseau's emphasis on feelings and Aesthetics which led Kant to add as a third faculty that of feeling. Some therefore call this identifying of the subject with the will, a return to the pre-Kantian view. Its vogue in the United States is due in part to its seeming to afford a basis to practical life and ethics. Its popularity is a part of our practical nature.

To my mind the refutation of the will-philosophy requires more training in Psychological lore than a setting aside of it by a better philosophy. Because, however, I do not pretend to have done justice to the latter and am unwilling to leave anything undone which may interest thinkers in it, it seems worth while to attempt a criticism of the will-philosophy. Perhaps enough weaknesses will be pointed out to shake the absolute confidence which it seems to enjoy in some circles. At any rate to those who are not already pledged to its support, our discussion may serve to show that its claims have not been overlooked.

The refutation of the will-philosophy is difficult because so much that is good seems inextricably bound up with it and furthermore there are no single lines of argument, which its advocates agree upon. Each writer takes a different position and the complaint of one of them (Caldwell, I think) that they do not present a solid front, but each spends his best energy in criticising the others, is justified.

We may perhaps distinguish three types. First there is no attempt to get outside of consciousness, the will is put for the subject and the concept for the object; Wundt and Ward have been regarded as exponents of this position. Second, the will or subject is outside and unsearchable while the object is the conceptual world (Schopenhauer). Third, the subject is conceived of as outside; consciousness is its functioning and the concepts or the results of its functioning make up the object. Of this view Münsterberg and the Neofichtians are the exponents. Often

the three types seem to be held in different pages of the same book, though in systematic thinking there is a constant tendency to start from the first type and be continually pushed along till the will has become a postulate in either the second or third types.

Schopenhauer.

Schopenhauer, for instance (*Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*), says in section 7: "Our point of departure has been from neither subject nor object, but from the *Vorstellung* which already contains both and presupposes both." This promises a psychological basis. In section 5, however, he identifies the *Vorstellung* with the object: "*Vorstellung* and object which are indeed one * * * object and *Vorstellung* are the same." And in section 18, paragraph 2, as also in the *Treatise on Sufficient Reason*, he identifies subject and will. In the latter part of section 7, he gives up finding the real subject in the *Vorstellung* at all. After he has shown the one-sidedness of Materialism and Solipsism and thus the interdependence between the subject and object, he continues that this enables us to see "that the innermost essence of the world, the *Ding an sich*, is not to be found in either of these two elements of the *Vorstellung*." In section 18, paragraph 1, he frankly confesses his inability to find the will in consciousness. "In fact the desired significance of the world which is given to me simply as my *Vorstellung*, or the passage from it as a mere *Vorstellung* of the knowing subject to that which it may be besides, would never be found if the investigator were nothing else than the purely knowing subject, a winged cherub without a body." This leads to the body as the point of departure.

Schopenhauer is worth quoting from at length because most of the will-philosophers are his disciples. Münsterberg we are reminded of all through here. For instance when he says (*Psychology*, p. 25): "If my being were merely a theoretical observation (*Auschauung*) of the surrounding then of course I would know of no *ich*

which should be given me different in principle from the surroundings.”

To return to Schopenhauer, in section 19, having forsaken Psychology as the point of departure, he takes the body: “The knowing subject is therefore an individual through this special relation to a body which is otherwise only a concept like all other bodies.” Section 18, paragraph 3: “This identity of the will and the body can never be proved. It is knowledge of a wholly peculiar sort whose truth, therefore, is not in any way to be brought under one of the four rubrics into which in the Treatise on Sufficient Reason, I divided all truth—I might, therefore, distinguish this truth from all others and call it the *κατ’ ἐξοχὴν* philosophical truth.” * This is honest but unconvincing. And finally: “the knowledge which I have of my will, although immediate, is not to be separated from my knowledge of my body.” Sec. 18, par. 2.

These quotations do more than to show the difficulties of the will-philosophy, they lead up to the fact that the will is to be associated with objects rather than with the subject; here with the body rather than with the consciousness, and in other cases with blind impulses and forces, all of which are under the head of *Vorstellungen* and energies. There is no call for a “*Wunder κατ’ ἐξοχὴν*” in finding a place for will among the other energies which make up the objective world. But of this later.

The Will as the Subjective Element in Consciousness.

We are called upon to discuss this as a distinct type of the will-philosophy, because, although the thinkers usually cited as exponents of the position are not themselves satisfied with it for their final basis, yet the opinion has gone about that some of our best Psychologists consider it a sufficient basis for a system, and isolated

* Compare the opinion with which James likes to dally: “Our entire feeling of spiritual activity or what commonly passes by that name is really a feeling of bodily activities. Psy. 1-301.

quotations from their works would seem to justify this belief. But Wundt, in spite of his apperception theory, which is supposed to support this position, follows in the footsteps of Schopenhauer, making the object all that is knowable and the unknown will the basis of the phenomenal.

Furthermore, although he is supposed to have started as a Psychologist and therefore Epistemology ought to be the basis of his system, his real point of departure is entirely external and philosophical. He begins with a distinction between natural sciences and spiritual sciences, of which a distinction between Will and Vorstellung becomes a consequence. We have already called attention to his inconsistency in subordinating practical philosophy to theoretical and yet in psychology reducing the object to the subject.

James also is not for a moment satisfied with finding the will as subject in an analysis of consciousness. He comes at his problem, which finally appears to be to justify a place for religion and the practical world in philosophy, again and again, always with a new line of argument. In one place he says his "reasons for belief in voluntary attention as a force are ethical." *Psy.* 1-454. In another he inclines with Schopenhauer to start from the body as a point of departure: "A supply of ideas of the various movements that are possible, left in the memory by experience of their involuntary performance, is thus the first prerequisite of the voluntary life." *Psy.* 2-458. Again in Vol. 2-534 he makes a sort of tri-partate division, like Spirit, Soul, and Body, and defines volition as a "relation not between our Self and extra-mental reality, but between our Self and our states of mind."

In Vol. 1-225 he takes an Epistemological start from "Thought goes on." Analysis shows him that the fifth and final element included in the process of thought is: "Thought chooses from among the objects independent of itself." This fifth element then becomes by mere assertion the basis for thought and choice becomes "the sim-

plest and most fundamental characteristic of thought!" What the word choice can mean, or selection either, to one who proclaims himself for the purpose of Psychology a determinist, it is hard to see. A determinist conception of will would seem at once to consign it to the category of objects. James, however, is a determinist only when he wants to be really scientific. The rest of the time he accepts free will.

The hopelessness of trying to find the will as a separate element in consciousness would seem to become entirely patent from the fact that whether with Laromiguiere and the earliest Will-philosophers, or with its latest advocates, it is always a *feeling* of strain or innervation or effort that must be spoken of. Compare Schopenhauer, (W. u. V. Sec. 21,) where he speaks of having knowledge as "a feeling that the essence of one's own appearance is will." And James 2-298: "For this central part of the Self felt." "The Self is the notion of an intimate activity or agency which has become *warm* through repeated emphasis," 1-298. Ladd, Psy., p. 61, defines an act of attention as "a purposeful volition suffused with peculiar feelings of effort or strain and accompanied by a changed condition of the field of discriminative consciousness as respects intensity, content and clearness. In this last definition the words "purposeful volition" are a tautologous repetition of what we set out to define, the third element confessedly is a mere accompaniment, and we have left as the definition of an act of attention "the peculiar feelings of effort or strain."

Aside from this we find that in all attempts to define what is meant by will, recourse is had to what we clearly recognize as the more objective factors in experience. All descriptions of will are taken from phenomena in the object world and the purest types of will are to be found in the least subjective facts. The answer usually made to this objection is, that the subject recognizes forces only because it has projected its own characteristics into objects. This answer is Metaphysical and along this line,

all content would be lost to the word object. Our reason for contrasting subject and object is gone. If the energy in the object is only the personification of the subject so is all the rest of the object.

Subject and object thus come very close together, but somehow the explanatory value of our analysis has been dissipated. In our identification of energy and subject we seem to be approaching the old materialism which tried to define consciousness in terms of motions. James' statement, *Psy.* 2-551: "It is the essence of consciousness (or of the neural process which underlies it) to instigate movement of some sort," will do as a statement of fact but not as a definition. The subject we are trying to define is something different from a force. The confusion between description and definition occurs again when consciousness is spoken of as a stream and the word stream is then put as its distinguishing and fundamental character.

It is here that we find the difficulty of the Monism which Panpsychism reaches. Its very ease makes it insufficient. If the psyche or will be unconscious then it was not found in consciousness, and therefore is a repetition of the old materialism. A Panpsychism, however, which puts consciousness into moving billiard balls is startlingly metaphysical and has contributed not one whit to either Epistemology or Psychology. All talk of an unconscious will tastes strongly of the division of the faculties. Compare Schopenhauer, *Sec.* 27: "In its lowest stages the will presents itself as a blind tendency, a dark senseless impulse."

The Subject as Will Superior to Consciousness.

As we have said those psychologists who represent the will philosophy have seen that the will as an energy surely includes objects and therefore is superior to both subject and object in consciousness or else as a subject reduces the objects to mere accidents of itself. They have practically quit the Epistemological starting point. It is absurd for them to keep up the pretense of deriving

the will from consciousness when it is perfectly capable of walking by itself as in involuntary activity. With their definition of the Psyche many psychic laws would be valid beyond the realm of consciousness.

The following quotations will show that some psychologists have had to give up finding the will as an element in consciousness. Ebbinghaus *Psy.*, p. 561: "Will acts are not basal appearances of the soul life in the same sense in which sensations and concepts are. They do not stand along side these as a new class of psychic elementary forms whose parts are or are not added at times to the parts of the other classes, but they stand above them. They are in their simplest terms the basal form of the unities in which alone sensations, concepts and feelings appear as real. The impulse (*Trieb*) is a will-act without the accompanying *Vorstellung*." Compare Schopenhauer, *Sec. 19*: "We must learn to distinguish from the will itself those things which belong to its appearance, which has many gradations; for instance, the being accompanied by knowledge and therefore the being determined by motives. These belong, as we shall see, not to its essence but only to its clear appearance as animal and man."

To return to Ebbinghaus, *Psy.* 565: "Will-acts are therefore not ultimate or original logically but chronologically they are." 566: The will is not "something new, different, added to the sensation, concept and feeling which can immediately be experienced but not further explained." 168: "Along with these three classes of forms" (feeling, sensation, and concepts) "there is no occasion to set up, in addition, will-acts or desires as special elementary forms of the soul life. The psychic conditions of conduct * * * are combinations of sensations, concepts, and feelings."

So Külpe, *Psy.*, p. 267, reduces will to effort and concludes "The elementary will quality, therefore would seem to reduce to definite sensations qualities."

Those who desire a fuller discussion of the will-psychology will find the ground thoroughly covered in a series of

articles by Bradley in *Mind* 1886, p. 305: "Is there any special activity of attention"; 1887, p. 354, "Association and Thought" (especially pages 366-7); 1888, p. 1, "On Pleasure, Pain, Desire, and Volition." The following quotations will show Bradley's position: "Is attention so far as it is *psychical* activity, an original element, and is there any specific function of attention? The strict result of the English analytical school would give us a negative answer to both of these questions. With that denial I agree and have not been able to find sufficient reason to doubt its truth." *Mind* 1886, p. 305. "If attention is not an event or a law of events, has it a right to exist in empirical science? Is it not simply a revival of the doctrine of the faculties? It becomes a phrase offered in explanation of phenomena beyond that field from which it has been drawn." *Mind* 1887, p. 366.

Ward's position against Bradley is given in *Mind* 1884, pp. 153 and 465; 1887, p. 45 (a reply to the criticisms by Bradley, and by Bain 1886, pp. 205 and 457) and 1887, p. 564.

Bradley has recently returned to the discussion: *Mind* 1901, p. 437 "Some remarks on Conation"; 1902, p. 1, "On active attention"; p. 289, "On Mental Conflict and Imputation"; p. 437, "The Definition of Will" (the series to be continued).

A very good review of Münsterberg's attack on Wundt's apperception theory is given by Croom Robertson in *Mind* 1890, p. 235. Ryland, in his review of Stout's *Manual of Psychology*, *Mind* 1901, 547, calls attention to the fact that Stout never once mentions the word apperception which in his previous work played the principal role.

Compare an article by Loveday on "Theories in Mental Activity" in *Mind* 1901, p. 455.

The Will as a Subject Intuited.

It might seem useless to leave the realm of Psychology and pursue the argument over into the realm of Philosophy, whither the preceding paragraph would take us;

especially as that carries us into the field where intuitions are weighed over against consciousness, and we are made acquainted with things that have not passed through the portal of knowledge. The name of Münsterberg, however, carries such an authority as being that of an able and careful psychologist that, though he frankly has forsaken psychology as his starting point ("The way to Psychology is through Philosophy"), the idea prevails that his psychology somewhere accounts for his identifying the subject with will. His approach like Wundt's is through a distinction between the *Geisteswissenschaften* and the *Naturwissenschaften*. He differs from Wundt only in classing psychology with the *Naturwissenschaften*. This seems to take away every basis of discussion; for, if psychology is not to be our point of departure but in some superior way has been consigned to the domain that deals only with objects, whence are we to obtain our subject. He seems to have two lines of argument, one reminding us of the Faith Philosophy and the other of Fichte. A fair example of the intuitional standpoint is the following, *Psy.*, p. 50: "The real ego is not something which is perceived and looked at by me but is the self-affirming (*stellungnehmende*) actuality of which I know only through inner activity and of which therefore I know in an incomparably different way (*Sinne*) from what I do of the concepts on which my ego lives (*an denen mein Ich sich auslebt*)". We might ask how he knows enough about this subject to call it will instead of letting it "answer to Hi or to any loud cry." Schopenhauer in Sec. 24, par. 2, of his *World as Will and Concept*, has a very ingenious explanation to account for the fact that this will which is the best known thing in experience has the fewest characteristics of knowability. His reasoning reduces it to the zero of knowability, and we cannot avoid comparing this infinite zero, as an explanation, with the infinite absolute of the old theological explanations.

Of Münsterberg's Fichtean line of argument the following is an example where there must be an Ich because

there is a nicht-Ich and where the whole world of objects, including all of existence requires a subject because there can be no object without a subject. We would say, if the logical analogy requires such an assumption in order to be valid then do not use it at all. Psy. p. 51, "Das Wollen requires das Nichtwollen and although blue has a meaning without a red, and even a black without a white, or cold without a hot, ein Wollen has no sense unless it rejects a Nicht-Wollen and a Nicht-Wollen points back to a Wollen." The verdict of a hundred years' discussion has been that an Ich whose only claim to reality is "Jenes Gegensatzverhältniss" (Psy., p. 51) is not called for.

Final Reasons for Rejecting the Identification of Subject and Will.

Before concluding this sketchy discussion of the will-philosophy we will mention three further reasons for rejecting the identification of the subject with will. First, if Mechanics is right in rejecting the word force as being anything more than a convenient term to group together certain occurrences, all content would be taken out of the word will and therefore out of the word subject as the basis for a system.

Second, no satisfactory place is found for feeling. Schopenhauer, Sec. 11: "The idea which the word feeling characterizes has only a negative content; viz, that something is present in the consciousness which is not abstract knowledge of the reason." In Sec. 18, par. 1, however, he classes the stronger feelings with will and the weaker ones with the Vorstellungen. Wundt and Paulsen try to attach feeling to the will in some way.

Third, no justice is done to the value part of life which includes the whole range of experience. To say with Wundt that will implies an end and an end implies a value is not sufficient. Other forces establish no ends and no value. No more can the will. If the worth in experience depends on the will-philosophy, the verdict

must be no worths—Pessimism. A will as an element with which is bound up a value element is manifestly a conglomerate and open to further analysis.

In rejecting the will as establishing the content of the subject, we have not overlooked the advantage that comes to Monism through the approach of the ego to the other objects of nature. The classical dualism between consciousness and matter seems to be overcome. The falling stone is a spirit like my moving body. Of course, we sympathize with all endeavors to unify experience, but there is such a thing as being too prompt in covering over differences through eagerness to reach the unity. In this case the advantage is gained by surrendering all the real content of consciousness. Through some clever feats of jugglery, consciousness has been put one side, and we have a world with no conscious element in it.

THE SUBJECT AS HAVING A CONTENT.

We are now ready to consider more positively what can best be meant by the analysis into subject and object. We shall try to put into the words some significance that shall assist us in classifying and understanding our experience. Some time a better line of cleavage may be discovered than that suggested by the words subject and object. In such a case, however, the inadequacy and not the uselessness of this present division will appear.

We believe that if the word subject is to be used at all it must have some content and be so far knowable. We cannot see the advantage of using the term if it is to be deprived of all content. It seems a confession of defeat to refuse it a meaning and a place in knowledge. The following objection from Münsterberg to giving it a content would apply to all knowledge, and he could say that the descriptions of redness or roundness are "retrospective substitutes" not present in knowing. The difficulty which he feels seems to be entirely artificial. "I feel as my ego my manner of acting which I experience when I exert myself. This is an actuality to me because I act. I know it because I will it. * * * In describing it

I would use words like feeling, impulse, will-acts, body-motions, and strains, but these would be retrospective substitutes not present during the will. I must try to describe the ego but not use the description as a point of departure for Epistemology." Violet odor is as describable as anything is and though the word may not be present while we are sniffing the air we would soon coin a word to represent it. The violet odor is certainly an integral part of our conceptual world. If reality be something hopelessly different in the case of the ego, it is likewise hopelessly different in the case of everything else.

Clues to the Meaning of Subject.

We may employ as clues to the meaning of the subject: first, the meaning of the object; and second, the result of the controversy over primary and secondary qualities.

The first serves as a clue, because the content of the word-object has been fairly well agreed upon; although, so far as I know, there is no unanimity in using a name to express this content.


Of course, in any knowledge, the subjective part cannot be entirely eliminated. But, in memory, we can fix our attention on a part that can more and more be separated out of its relation in consciousness, out of its actual experience, and regarded by itself. The orange, as experienced, is really before me, only as it is round and yellow and odorous and resisting in consciousness. But abstracting these qualities I can still think of an orange as by itself, independently of the relation in consciousness. It remains because of its relation to other objects. This object, if the abstraction be carried on far enough, becomes a mere form, an imaginary thing in itself (*Ding an Sich*) which I can conceive of with all its attributes removed. This is the pure object which is never reached but is approached as a limit

In the same way a room full of chairs is entirely dependent on consciousness and experience for full reality, but by separating out the relations in consciousness (the qualities) we can think of the chairs as objects by them-

selves when no one is there to see them. We can think of them in rows. We can compare them with other chairs in other rooms. We can reason about them. We can draw pictures of them. We can in our minds rearrange them. But to restore reality again the relation in consciousness must be re-introduced.

For this object, thought of in abstraction from the relation in consciousness, the Germans have been inclined to use the word *Vorstellung* (presentation, concept). In the threefold division it corresponds to intellection. In some uses of the word it corresponds to the word knowledge, and therefore Croom Robertson wished to substitute the word intellection for knowledge (*Mind* O. S. 8, p. 15). The word reasoning as contrasted with sentiments is often used as distinguishing it.

This object, we said, was made up of relationships thought of in abstraction from the relation in consciousness. The further the abstraction is carried the more phenomenal does the object become. Its furthest limit is the purely formal relation of mathematics. Mathematics states the relations which may hold between objects no matter what the reality be that consciousness puts in. The ultimate objects of mathematics are points, positions, absolute abstractions, where the thing has only position.



Universals in Object World.

An answer to the question what becomes of necessity and universals under this conception of objectivity will elucidate the position. The relations are necessary only in that they are formal. A line is necessarily a line because we have conceived of it as a line. The statement that all geese are white is true for all time. If a black goose should be discovered we would have the choice either of refusing to call it a goose or else of changing our concept goose. The forms are necessary. It is not necessary that certain objects be put into particular forms. The actual mathematical relations into which we put experience are the result of a long struggle for existence between different forms. We may call them categories, not brought by the subject, but by experience as a whole. New experience calls for new forms. Not that the old forms are thus proven false, but inapplicable. Plane measurement was right and is right, but to surfaces upon the earth we now apply spherical measure.

This is true of all classifications and formulations whether in physics or in the doctrinal forms of religion. The content of experience outgrows the particular form. Euclidian geometry is true for all time and for all minds that construct a plane geometry. Experience must show whether stellar orbits are to be put into its forms or not. So the forms represented by the words subject and object may change from generation to generation. Controversy must decide which is fittest to survive. There is therefore nothing in the persistence of controversies in the domain of truth to frighten us. We must expect that controversies about the fittest form will persist even after experience has ceased to present anything new.



This view of the object world as made up of surviving forms might be made of wider application and all the contours and colors into which experience now runs as into moulds might be regarded as transient forms which a still wider experience will ignore. So the human body itself might be a form whose passing did not mean ani-

hilation. This is not an acceptance of the fourth dimension world view, although it is a recognition of the apparent inadequacy of our present forms to account for the whole of experience.

The World of Truth.

Of the various words which in part represent what is meant by object in the analysis of consciousness, the one which appears best adapted to sum them all up, seems to be the word truth.

There are two objections to the word concept; first, the word has been historically associated with the metaphysical subject and thus has been used in contrast with the material object. The following diagrams illustrate the varied uses of the word concept:



Second, the word refers to a single object and thus does not bring out the fact that objects are distinguished as such by their complete relativism *inter se*. An object as an object is never anything by itself but always in relation to other objects. Concept is, therefore, too concrete a word. The one we select must be thoroughly abstract. An object grows out of an experience through an abstract process of comparison. An object acquires a meaning as an object only by reference to an object world, not primarily by contrast with the subject. Of this we shall speak later. The essential characteristic of the object world is the relativism independent of the relation to the subject.

This characteristic of complete relativism, the word truth is fitted to express. We may therefore put the world of truth as synonymous with the phrase "object world." The orange can be spoken of as an object only when its relations, temporal, spacial, color, etc., to other objects is thought of. As an object therefore it is abstract and not concrete. When concreteness or reality is given to any portion of the object world then the subjective element is restored and so far its objective character is taken away, although practice enables us to return at will to the abstraction.

The word truth moreover does not lead to a division of faculties as would the word intellection, yet all the distinctive characteristics of intellection as set over against feeling are in it.

As it includes all possible relations of objects, it is sufficiently broad to be used in the realm of psychology and motives and will-acts.

The objection might be made that the word truth already includes the whole of experience and reality, and therefore is too broad, since it embraces the feelings and the subject also. We reply that the word reality is a broader word than truth. It is possible always to represent reality in terms of truth, but reality is more than merely true. A statement that I fell down, may be true

or false; my falling down is neither true nor false. The word true is not applicable. My falling down is a *real* occurrence.




Primary and Secondary Qualities.

With a fairly well defined conception of what is meant by object in our analysis we may pass on to the second clue in finding a content for the subject.

Locke discovered that certain of the qualities of objects did not belong to the object, but were rather to be put on the side of the subject. These he distinguished as the secondary qualities. Berkley and Hume then showed that the primary qualities were likewise to be thrown to the side of the subject and that there was no distinction to be made between primary and secondary qualities. The object was thus rapidly being dissipated. Kant tried to retain it as a *Ding an sich*, but the next generation rejected even this vestige.


The following diagrams will illustrate the positions of Locke, Kant and Fichte:



The qualities, therefore, are particularly characteristic of the subject.

The World of Worth.

The qualities especially associated with the senses are color, taste, odor, hardness, smoothness, etc. Those connected with feeling are pain, pleasure, etc. With the emotions are associated hatred and love. With the whole world of subjectivity are associated the qualities of value and worth.



Now looking all these qualities over, the most inclusive one, the one best suited to stand for them all, seems to be represented by the word worth.

Doubtless objections to the word come to the mind at once, and perhaps in time a happier word will be hit upon. But this word seems at least to lie in the right direction.

It is abstract but purposely so because it stands for only part of consciousness or reality, abstracted away. It is what has been abstracted from the objective elements.

It is not meant to be the supporter for the whole of experience nor for the whole of the person. It is not the metaphysical subject. It does not by itself stand for reality as opposed to the phenomenal object world. It is not meant to be the synthesis of all the elements in consciousness.

It can not be concrete because the concrete is the union of both the subject and object.

It is not a substance. It is not tangible. The word worth is farthest removed from objective relations. But it does sufficiently stand for the subjective part in all states of consciousness.

We can never use the word worth without having reference to a subject. An object can have a worth only as related to a subject in consciousness. If ever it is used of one object in relation to another, the second object is

thereby personified. The most elaborately constructed machine, with perfect harmony of parts, is, by itself, valueless, and if ever the word worth is used of anything, it is evidence that the personal or subjective element has entered. No other word is so characteristic of the ego, of the "I," of subjects, of persons.

Compare Prof. Ladd's statement (Phil. of Conduct p. 37): "Every form and degree of what men call either good or bad has reference to a state of sentient and conscious life and all higher and more significant forms to the experiences of a self-conscious life—if conscious life were extinguished there would be no more good. What is good? What is bad? States of selves and what has reference to states of selves."

If it be objected that the word worth is not positive enough because there is no agreement as to what is valuable, the reply is that that is just the reason why it is best suited to what we mean by the subject, inasmuch as each consciousness has its own conception of worth.

But does it not exalt too much the pleasure-pain factor, thus lowering the dignity of life to the plane of utilitarianism, and on the other hand can the word worth be used for the subjective part in such neutral sensations as color and form? In reply to the first question we say that the word worth includes everything that is noblest in life. And in answer to the second, that if there is such a thing as a "neutral feeling" the word worth should be extended to include it. In fact, however, the word, though usually used of the highest forms of subjectivity, stands for the essence of the first conscious life when it is as yet hardly to be distinguished from so-called unconscious reactions. The birth of consciousness in the lowest animal life is indicated by the appreciation of worths and not by the feeling. The subjective factor in the simplest organism is not feeling but worth, and only in a highly developed consciousness are certain subjective elements degraded to feelings.

The word worth is neither active nor passive. Nor can the word that stands for the subject be either active or

passive, activity and passivity being words used of objective relations. Feeling is usually thought of as passive and desire as active. Worth is able to stand for the subjective part in both. In desire the analysis into subject and object has progressed far enough for the worth part to be singled out and treated as an object by being compared with other worths.

The analysis of consciousness into worth and truth embraces what seemed to be the entirely distinct antitheses of person and thing (or ego and non-ego) and feeling and thought. This latter antithesis is as fundamental as the former, though as more psychological it has not been so prominent in the great systems. Feeling is very different from the recognition of relations. "No feeling as such or as felt is a relation—even a relation between feelings is not itself a feeling or a felt." (Green in Mind O. S. 7-28.) "Through feelings we become acquainted with things, but only by our thoughts do we know about them." (James Psy. 1-222.)

The analysis we have made accounts for a phenomenon which so far as I know Wm. Hamilton was the first to emphasize, namely that knowledge and feeling—perception and sensation, though always co-existent, are always in the inverse ratio of each other. (Spencer Psy. 2 p. 252.)

We may speak of worth as a category applied to experience and thus corresponding to the category of truth, the former including value, feeling, sensing, etc., and the latter relationship, and ultimately time-space-cause.

The following diagrams will illustrate the position :



The same diagram illustrates the dualisms in the history of philosophy, though today we would prefer to avoid using the words internal and external which result from applying to the experience of others a distinction which is not true of our own experience nor of theirs. Matter and spirit moreover would be put both on the object side. Cogitatio would be put in the center with an ego not further defined to correspond to the extensio.



In these illustrations, both an X and a Y are necessary to establish every point. Even if we put Y equals 0, the zero here does not mean nothingness but a smaller number than any we may give. Zero is a limit indefinitely approached but never reached. The same with the subjective and objective elements in consciousness. In thinking of a mathematical triangle or of a chemical atom the subjective element is reduced to zero; in a pain, on the contrary, the objective element is zero. Of course, they are right who maintain that pure subject can never be reached, but with equal right can we say that pure object can never be reached nor pure zero. Now that the phenomenality of the object world is so frequently put forward, we may be more ready to pay attention to worths which seemed to be so hopelessly phenomenal as to deserve no place in science which was content with nothing less than absoluteness.

The Ego or Self.

The ego or self, which determined us in selecting the words subject and object for our analysis, is a very complex thing. Into the idea there enters unity, energy, worth, and perhaps other elements. The subjective characteristic of the ego or self, however, is not its unity (Ladd), nor its energy (James); it is the appreciation of worths. The two former may or may not be essential to the conception, but when the third goes the self goes. The self or ego as a whole is to be thrown technically to the object side. It is a concept in which the factors of unity and force have been added to the worth side in consciousness.

Out of undifferentiated experience, that is, experience not yet become consciousness and therefore not experience in our sense of the word, it is the distinction between value and relation, (essentially, logically, and chronologically primary,) which produces consciousness. This distinction, in fact, marks the birth of consciousness. Here also is the beginning of memory. We may say, perhaps, that the transformation of mere reflexes into consciousness, which psychologically is due to memory and distinguishes the now from the then, is epistemologically the result of the distinction between value and relation. The *now* is thus inseparably associated with the subject and with the ego.

No matter how true may be the insistence of our analysis on the worth side of life, psychologically it stands or falls with its ability to account for the empirical ego or self. Although we do not deny the validity of other analyses, we are not content with showing merely that our analysis is important and is justified by experience. Our claim is that it is fundamental and primary in psychology, and that from the difference between a relation and a value is derived that striking difference which I experience between the self and the not-self. We are far therefore from rejecting the ego as "unrettbar." The ego must remain but as a worth and not as a unit or an

energy. For this cause do we go into the discussions of the next few headings, which are indeed difficult to deal with satisfactorily. Our purpose is to show that these topics can be as intelligibly discussed from our standpoint as from any other and in my opinion better discussed.

One reason for the difficulty of seeing the availability of our analysis in accounting for the experience of the self is that the latter seems so concrete; as though we could pass on every side of it (except one), while the epistemological subject is an abstraction to be looked at as a picture on a wall, artificial, the product of imagination. The self throws itself at us like something hard, while the subject in consciousness is a gossamer web which gives way wherever we try to seize it. If our philosophy has taught us that the book which we look at on the table is, as a book, an abstraction similar in kind to the book which we think of with our eyes closed, this difficulty will disappear. The consciousness of self is the result of abstractions and has many gradations. When insistently pursued it scatters out each side along the way, leaving us to follow after a smaller and smaller thing which finally becomes, to our fixed gaze, indistinguishable from a non-existent.

Another difficulty in seeing the availability of our analysis in accounting for the fact of the self is that to some the latter seems necessary as an agent for fulfilling the functions of thinking. Can the states of consciousness, it is asked, do the thinking? Those who have been able to dismiss the agencies in physics and biology should be able to do the same here.

Still another difficulty is that by asserting the phenomenality of both subject and object and yet putting all experience into one of these two categories, we resign any hope of knowing reality. The diagrams which we have used will, it is hoped, show that we experience reality, and if the word knowledge is used in a different sense from experience, then we know only a part of reality.

Here the question may be raised: "What becomes of objective reality under this view?" This question deserves special consideration.

Objective Reality.

Any object is objectively real when it is so completely related to the whole world of experience that we can assert its reality without taking into consideration a particular reality through an act of consciousness. Of an experience or state of consciousness, the objective reality depends on our ability to relate it to the object world because of its persistence in spite of changed objective relations or changed senses. The experience of a rainbow has less objective reality than that of a stone because it does not seem to have a fixed relation to the object world. A pain has almost no objective reality because it seems to have no fixed objective relations and moreover cannot be seen, heard, tasted, or smelled. We may say that the objective reality of an experience depends on our ability to describe or define it in terms of other objects.


The word concrete, therefore, though every experience and state of consciousness is concrete, is also used of objects which are in manifold relations to other objects. The objective reality of an object depends on the concreteness which it preserves on account of its abundant relations to other objects which are immediately related to the subject through experience, even though in the case of that particular object the subjective factor is reduced to zero. So an unseen planet may be known as objectively real and some would be willing to call it concrete even though no telescope has ever detected it. And so aragon is real and in one use of the word, concrete, though no sense has ever sensed it.

It is in this significance that some would distinguish between a real world and an existent world, using the former term of the epistemologically real world where subject and object are united in consciousness and the latter term of the world, thought of as real, independent of the relation to the subject. This latter is an ab-

straction. It is also in the latter sense that some systems speak of progressive reality with the ultimately real or the absolute, as unattainable. A thing begins to be real, upon the y axis, as soon as thought of as a possible link in the network of relations which makes up the objective world. With no break does it increase in reality while the network is made finer and finer and more and more extensive until that particular link is in infinite relations with every other link. This goal can never be reached and the extreme edges of the network must always be frayed, hence the unattainableness of the absolute.

Experience and Consciousness.

In the use of the two words experience and consciousness the division into the two categories of the subject and object has already progressed so far that though they cover the same ground, the word experience has in mind the objective relations and the word consciousness the subjective relations. Each covers the whole of reality. Perhaps the following diagram will illustrate this:



A representing reality, A^1 and A^2 are where the subjective factors have been more neglected, and A_1 and A_2 where the objective factors. All five represent the same original experience or state of consciousness, the word experience being represented by the dark portions and the consciousness by the light portions.

When psychology claims to deal with consciousness, it can claim to cover every fact of experience and is therefore the all embracing science. On the other hand the science of experience (experimental science) covers every fact and subordinates psychology to a branch of itself and works out a psychology without consciousness, consciousness being an accidental spectator. Hence has resulted the problem of psycho-physical parallelism, with the result that psychology must be put either on one side or the other or divided into two distinct sciences. The problem is overcome when we learn that both consciousness and experience are already abstractions covering the same reality. As fast as consciousness is reduced to experience, we can speak of science. Historically and logically, therefore, we limit the term psychology to that borderland where the diremption between subject and object has not been completely carried out. Psychology has to deal with that part of the field of experience or consciousness where those elements which have the least objectivity, and the most subjectivity are being reduced to objective relations. Psychology, therefore, does not deal with the subject as such.

Two Tests of Reality.

There are then two tests of reality, the fact of the relation to an object and the fact of a relation to a subject,—two ways of controlling, establishing, and imparting reality (experience or consciousness itself being not impartable). Anything, for instance the unseen planet Neptune, that is in the objective relation, is real and therefore can be conceivably put into the subjective relation so as to give it full or epistemological reality. Anything that is in the subjective relation like a pain is also real and can conceivably be put in the objective relations so as to be given full or epistemological reality.†

Now the words truth and worth represent the graduation of Epistemology out of its own realm, where the

†NOTE—This is a much more significant than Hegel's (Phil. of Law, Preface): "What is reasonable is actual and what is actual is reasonable."

words subject and object might be sufficient, into the larger world of thought and life. We are therefore able to assert the reciprocity between truth and value, so that though they are independent variables, they are ultimately united in a higher monism, corresponding in the universe as a whole to the undivided real which is the starting point of epistemology. Just as we asserted that what ever had objective relations therefore had subjective also, and whatever had subjective relations had objective also, so whatever is true, has a worth and (a point usually overlooked), whatever has a value is proportionately real and therefore is true.

Worth as a Test of Reality.

The establishing of this last point at once gives to Religion the basis in epistemology which it has seemed to lack. Religious positions are not held because of their truth—for Geometry is true yet not a religion—but they are held because of their value. We leave this thus stated dogmatically because this is not the place to go into a historical and analytical proof of the statement.

Suffice it to say that when worth is identified with the subjective element, with the person, the spirit-world of religion and the world of love of Christianity, become identified with the worth element in life and with the subject of Epistemology.

Looking at a fact common sense says this has a value for me and it concludes that this is therefore true. And common sense is practically right. The truth may be grievously mixed up with error, but somewhere there is truth and when many agree in finding a value, of course so much more certain may we be that there is an objective correlative somewhere. If it be a hallucination it is a relation to a former object.

Again and again have scientists taken up supposed realities which appeal to men as having great worth and have demonstrated them untrue and have been surprised to see the position accepted as real in spite of their demonstrations. Common sense very rightly says, "May

not your demonstration be just as faulty as my estimate of worth."

Only after constructive criticism, following in the wake of destructive criticism, has pointed out the new value will common sense forsake the old position. Be the proof never so clear, reasoning has never yet been able to overthrow a single religious tenet; the only way to remove a religious position—and a sure way it is—is to show its lack of value.

If we ask which religion has gained an influence, history will answer, "that which has established the reality of its positions by most clearly showing their worth; but where a religion has tried to establish the reality of its positions principally through their truth, it has so far ceased to have a religious influence." It has ceased so far to be a religion and has become a science. We can also account for a seeming paradox justified by experience; namely, that that faith is the most religious which is against reason (Kierkegaard, *Einübung im Christenthum*.) This is because such a faith must have a great value.

With these two tests the advance into the realm of reality is an advance on two legs, worth bringing truth into new fields and truth leading the way to new worths. Instances of the latter are found in our every day life. Of the former we may cite as instances the doctrines of free-will, of immortality, and of divine sonship where truth has gained new insight into psychology, cosmology and into the conception of God, because men refused to give these doctrines up when they were "proven untrue." Many a man who felt the hopelessness of his life, if his religious creed were to be given up, has been forced to meditate more profoundly and has found truth where to the superficial view there seemed only error.

The Will.

The question must already have arisen, what becomes of the will under this analysis. The answer will be found along the line of argument of "panpsychistic"

Monism. The will is an energy like electricity, heat and other energies. It is distinctly a spiritual energy. We do not argue whether the idea of energy is obtained from contemplating the object world or is a feeling belonging peculiarly to the subject and by it projected into objective relations. We merely take as a fact the idea of energy and ask whether it falls naturally to the side of the object or the subject, when we try to have that analysis do justice to the whole of consciousness. We do not question the privilege of any one to take the two words, subject and object, and to put relation, for instance, for the latter, and energy for the former. We only say that then the feeling part, the worth part in consciousness, has not been recognized, and that we are in materialism again—its grossness gone and sublimated into energy but nevertheless materialism. We have, with such an analysis, no subject that can stand as such in a state of consciousness. Such an assignment of roles to subject and object does not come from Epistemology but from Cosmology. In Cosmology the will is the most important factor. The impelling thing in life is the pressure of the will to exert itself. It often appears that men do not act because of the pleasure or reward, but because the pleasure offers a mode of greater life, because it is a greater vent to power. The doctrine of *energism* deserves the important place it has assumed in our thinking. Above the gravity energies, above the physical and chemical energies, stands in importance the will energy. Yet not so different from them as some have thought. Through blind passions and through impulses it by degrees grades over into them. It partakes of their determinism, just as the doughtiest of its champions has granted.

In what point then does it differ from them? In our postulating of it a worth side, a subject side, not revealed to us directly but indirectly in accounting for its appearance. A will or a person is not an epistemological subject, but an object which reflection shows us must have an independent worth. Therefore, we may say that it is not a subject but a subject-object appearing to us

primarily as an object and secondarily as a subject. The full recognition of the subjective part or the independent worth of Wills as distinct from Energies was introduced comparatively late into human thought, through the command, "Love thy neighbor as thyself." This means to feel the worth of your neighbor as you feel that of self.

In giving an account of will we have had in mind what seemed to be the most common use. So widely used a word has many shades of meaning. Sometimes will power denotes intellectual concentration and is closely akin to memory. In fact, memory and a sense of worths are sufficient to give anyone will-power.

Sometimes the will is differentiated from other energies by the phrase "final-cause," and at the same time an element of values is introduced. What actually happens in such cases is that a conception of a value is present as an efficient cause. The fact that the achievement is in the future does not justify any real distinction in a final cause. Final causes introduce confusion rather than clearness. The word cause or the phrase efficient cause is sufficient to cover the laws of relations of wills, and the worth element is already present in the conception. It cannot be introduced by any futurity.

Freedom of Will.

With the will as an object in the world of necessity, the question arises as to the freedom of the will.

The universality of the laws of the object world attach to the same degree to the will which is an object. To reach the conception of contingency we must revert to what has been already said in regard to Universals. Any law which we state as universally valid, is universally valid until we decide to modify the content of either the subject or the predicate. Dry powder touched by fire explodes, we say, because if it does not, it isn't powder. A single instance creates a law. Any object, powder for instance, is an abstraction quite as much as the law; there is therefore nothing surprising in objects

or abstractions obeying abstract rules. New experiences produce new objects and call for new laws. In one sense laws control objects and have been valid from eternity, in another sense experience produces the laws. Here, then, we have given the world of unchangeable law, but in the increase of experience is introduced the element of contingency into the world because new laws are called into being.

So in one sense the will is strictly determined by motives. On the other hand, new states of consciousness and new worths introduce contingency. We can explain fairly well why we acted in the past, but not how we will act in the future. This is because an experience in the future, not yet become real, cannot be put into the categories of subject and object, and therefore we do not know its law or its worth. The worth of the particular experience does not precede that experience. Only after an experience has come do we learn its worth.

Worth as subject is therefore not a motive; motives are previous experiences where the experience as a whole is looked at as an object or concept by itself. This meets the contention that because the pleasure accompanies and does not precede the act, pleasure cannot be a motive.

Spirit and Matter.

The same reasoning which we used in regard to the will as an independent worth answers the query as to what becomes of the spirit with this entirely epistemological view of the subject.

Our analysis enables us to give to the traditional distinction between spirit and matter a meaning without introducing any such gulf as is usually implied. Matter being energy and all energy being thrown to the object side, a spirit is an energy in which I postulate, *a posteriori*, an independent worth or subject, independent because not depending on the relation to my subject. This is a confession that our knowledge of other selves is not immediate and *a priori*, but no more is my knowledge of myself. In fact all knowledge is the result of

analysis. It is a matter of opinion or of evidence just how far we are to go in applying the term spirit to the energies which we meet.

There is no strict line of demarcation to be drawn between the spirit-sciences and the nature-sciences although they may be distinguished. The former take the worths into consideration, the latter as far as possible eliminate the worth element. History, for instance, may be taken up from either standpoint. The relative importance of the study of history from the standpoint of worths has, very naturally perhaps, been underestimated. The study of history from the scientific standpoint explains the past and to a small extent gives an insight into the future. It provides maxims. When we require counsel and leadership, however, he who has appreciated the worths in history, possesses that subtle prophetic power which seems like inspiration or intuition. The mere study of past relations and past causes produces incompetent directors of affairs because circumstances are never the same. New rights are growing all the time. The control of affairs is to be entrusted to him who through his broad appreciation of worths is able to appreciate new worths before enough is known about them for science to work out the laws of their relations. Very silly does the development of events make the advice seem of him who has looked on history only externally, studying its laws but not pulsing with its heart. And how marvellous seems the intuition of him who has forefelt his fellow men. He becomes the Saviour.

Ethical Laws.

It is this fact of new worths which justifies the recognition of new rights, new ethical laws and the passing of old ones. The old rights and the old laws are as valid for the old circumstances as ever. They were and are universals, only that the laws of the sulphates do not apply to the paraffine series. If a thing is right once it must be for all time. New circumstances, however, bring into being new rights which supplant the old ones,

although they do not prove them wrong. In a sense, therefore, every age and country and every individual has new ethical laws according to the variation of worths. The variations are not different in kind nor very different in degree from the variations in the perception of the sense objects.

One of the favorite arguments against the emphasis on values has been the lack of agreement introduced into ethics. There seems to be no basis for imparting conviction and certainty. In practice, however, it is hard to compel agreement as to whether a given ball is exactly spherical in shape. In the world of worths we have canons and rules that may be applied. The disagreement comes in deciding whether they apply to the given circumstances. Absolute truth has not been reached, nor absolute worth. The categorical imperative either in logic or ethics, gives only what I conceive to be right with hope for more light later. The parallel uses of the word right in its two meanings, ethical and logical, the one in line with the most worth and the other in line with the greatest truth, are not so very different.

In the sphere of Ethics and of Practical philosophy in general, we stand on a better epistemological basis when we use as the characteristic word the word worth rather than the word ought. The distinction between the world that is and the world that ought to be has become quite current. Prof. Sidgwick's posthumous work, "Philosophy, its scope and relations," is an attempt to win a place for a science of "what ought to be." The obvious answer to such an attempt is: "Everything that is, ought to be." In the appendix to Lecture 2 he confesses the failure to articulate the two. In giving his reasons for not treating of the relations of philosophy to religion he says, "In the first place I may say that it was not due to any desire to depreciate the importance of theology or to leave it on one side. On the contrary, as I have tried to indicate, the fundamental question to which theology gives an answer—as to the relation of what is, to what ought to be—represents in my view the final and most

important task of philosophy—I was impressed with the difficulty either of separating it” (the common element of religious thought) “from the historical element with which it is combined in current rationalistic theologies, or if I introduced it along with this historical element, of giving any statement of it that would claim to rank—in respect of consensus of experts—with the positive sciences. I by no means say that there should not be made a serious attempt to overcome this difficulty; but I think it must be made in the first instance by theologians.”

After all, ethics and religion find no sufficient basis in will because no one ever did anything that he did not wish to do; nor in Kant’s doing a thing against desire, for that is an impossibility; nor in a categorical imperative, for this requires a further basing in the temperament and personality; nor in the world that ought to be. “A science of ethics begins only when it is seen that men’s actions are consciously directed towards or unconsciously terminate in some one of the several forms of “the Good.” (Prof. Ladd, *Phil. of Conduct*, p. 41.)

Mental and Physical.

Furthermore our analysis does justice to the facts which gave rise to the dualism between the mental and the physical, without however introducing any ontological dualism.



Two senses in which the word mental is used must be here distinguished. First, in the logical sense, like intellect, set over against the experiences where feeling enters in, it is used of concepts, and therefore is thrown further over to the object axis than is the physical.

Second, as a result of an ontological dualism already carried out, where an inner world is contrasted with an outer, the word mental is used for the former. Here it seems to correspond to psychic. As this brings it very close to the feelings the mental seems to be an extra layer, if we might so imagine it, laid on top of the physical in the illustration above, extending from the feelings to the concepts (compare page 35). This use of the word mental as characterizing an inner world set over against the outer world we must reject as leading to confusion. If it is used as synonymous with psychic or conscious, covering the whole of experience but with special regard to the epistemological subject or worth of the experience, there is no objection save that this must be recognized as different from the conceptual world and must not lead us into the old dualism of *cogitatio* and *extensio*.

If we take *cogitatio* as our starting point and reach as a conclusion "therefore I am," we have not given a basis for "it is." We are solipsists. If we wish to add this latter element we cannot retain the "being" element in either, and therefore out of "I think," our conclusion is "therefore I and it." The "being" element or element of existence calls for another antithesis, that of feeling and value. Accordingly from "I am thinking," "an existent and a value" is the conclusion. In the second antithesis the I and it also find a meaning, and the corrected syllogism would be, "I think therefore I as value and it as being." The existence of the ego is derived *a posteriori* and only *a posteriori* are we justified in identifying the ego represented by our body with the subject of the epistemological analysis. Probably the process is not very different from the way in which the eye is identified with our sensing of light. A fixed head with-

out the powers of motion would not know whether it saw with its eyes or its ears, and the question would never occur to it.

The principal cleavage is not between the mental or psychic and the physical, but between the world of relation and the world of value. Windelband's fundamental distinction between the idio-thetic and the nomo-thetic sciences comes to our minds here.

Nominalism and Realism.

All objectification is abstraction and all objective reality is also abstraction, so that a name differs from an object only in the extent to which the abstraction has been carried towards the object-axis.




This is the same solution as that presented by conceptualism, but there had always seemed to remain lurking a distinction between a concept and an object which was not accounted for. The concept stove is a real object, therefore real in the same way that the concept my kitchen stove is real. Every object stands apart by itself because of a process of abstraction and the general term is as objectively real as the particular. The concept my kitchen stove is likewise a universal as much as any gen-

eral idea and its relations will be always valid, the only question being whether any particular experience is to be brought under its category.

The Classification of Sciences.

The difficulties that have arisen in the classification of sciences have not been so much in the actual ordering of them as in the reasons for the ordering. Psychology and logic have presented the principal difficulties as to place.

Our analysis overcomes the inherent contradiction in Spencer's system, where the whole progress was from abstract to concrete, while the progress in each science was from concrete to abstract, and it reconciles this system with the "hierarchy" of Comte's and the more cumbersome classifications of Wundt, Grasserie, and Trivero.



The classification is linear with the exception of philosophy and theology which from opposite directions ad-

vance toward the same unity. With our conception of objectivity, logic finds its place among the objective sciences with mathematics, to which it can indeed be reduced. For instance, trees + other plants = all plants; the poplar + other trees = all trees; hence the poplar + other trees + other plants = all plants.

Sociology would be divided between anthropology, folk-psychology and ethics. Epistemology, used of a particular part oftentimes included in the word psychology, comes at the very point where experience is analyzed into truth and worth.

In the diagram, the places assigned indicate rather the directions and the comparative places, than absolute places. Quality, for instance, continues with diminishing presence clear to the object axis.

We reject the classification into *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geistwissenschaften*, because it has no epistemological basis and moreover leads to impossible juxtapositions and separations. Compare Wundt's *Einleitung in die Philosophie*.

THE BEARING OF OUR ANALYSIS ON THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION.

An analysis can claim a right to attention in proportion to the number and range of the facts for which it provides an account. If we find our analysis into subject and object, into worth and truth, serving as a key for the solution of difficulties and contradictions, we shall be more certain that we are proceeding along the right lines. Some of these problems which come up in philosophy we have spoken of. Although this paper makes its appeal to the philosophical reader, it may not be out of place to indicate the bearing of this analysis on some of the problems of religion.

It articulates religion and philosophy and provides the former with an epistemological basis as firm as is that of the latter.

Similarly it furnishes a basis in psychology for the Ritschlian contentions in behalf of value-judgments and frees them from the accusations of requiring two kinds of truth.

It provides a theoretical conception of God, one reasoned out, which can be of influence in the practical world as well as in the theoretical world.

Christianity becomes truly Christo-centric which no other psychological system has ever made it. This is a matter of supreme importance to those who are interested in the betterment of Society.

To make the appeal to men as children of worth will serve as a stepping stone to show them that they are children of God. The latter phrase by itself usually means very little.

To realize one's self, one's own reality, has been identified with becoming religious, and rightly because it is feeling one's worth as well as one's objective relations.

Save where values are found in the elements of consciousness, attempts to bolster up the nobility of life must always seem weak.

Religion becomes empirical, worked out by experience, dependent on experience, and not imposed from the outside. It becomes positivistic.

Our analysis turns the attention of religion from the puzzles to the practical part.

It justifies the use of the word faith, where faith means to feel the worth of. This has always been the real distinction between faith and belief, belief referring to the intellectual apprehension. It is faith in Christ, the sense of the worth of him to my life and the life of those around me which propagates the Gospel. The belief his objective relations is from the religious standpoint a secondary consideration. To one who feels the worth, the moving of mountains becomes a possible thing. This interpretation of faith shows how it may be central in the same religion which takes love as its central principle, the basal idea in each word is, to feel the worth of.

A creed becomes a statement, not of what one believes, but of what one values, and the latter is the true test of character. Tests of creeds, like that given by Newman in his *Grammar of Assent*, viz., "their vitality, their coherence and their fruitfulness," become valid, and all similar defences of a religion from its effects receive a scientific justification; for instance, Balfour's "need" as a justification for religious belief. It is in the same way that in experimentation it is the "need" which causes us, in order to account for certain phenomena, to postulate and to accept the reality of substances which no one has ever touched or tasted. With the need increases the reality.

Moreover, the phenomena presented by the so-called psychology of religion are less perplexing. The religious sense increases with increased faculty for discriminating and feeling values. An emotional temperament accordingly is especially open to religious experiences. The objectifying tendency which naturally detracts from the intensity of the religious experience, often restores the intensity by the keener discrimination which it affords. The intellectual power of the mind is not the only measure of the power for experience, and it sometimes happens that mental weakness may be accompanied by an exuberance of religious feeling.

The questions which arise from the study of the history of religions also fall into line. What seem to be independent approaches to religion through poetic mythology, through selfish propitiation and through the increasing ethical sense have their common root in our distinction between the subject and object.

A miracle may then be defined as an evidence that there is a purpose in the universe. The supernatural is the personality, or independent worth, or the subject in the world.

Pessimism is refuted at its very source, for, as a misanthrope is one who has too high an estimate of man, so a pessimist has an idea of a value in existence not justified by the objective relations of experience.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY.

I am conscious of the sketchy character of my treatment of our subject. Many of the difficulties that arose have not been satisfactorily met, and there are some difficulties to which I have not even dared to refer. All that I venture to hope is that it is a step in the right direction. Even if I have not found the final place of values the treatment will not be in vain, provided it serves to cast a vote, as it were, by a show of hands, in behalf of a recognition by philosophy of worths. Perhaps some one better fitted and better able may be stimulated by the very failures to establish a more worthy place for values and to articulate better our every day life and wants, to the systems of thought.

By way of summary, I will indicate what I consider the most important points of the essay:

First, the attempt it makes to treat the subject of values psychologically.

Second, the basis in psychology which it provides for Christianity.

Third, the place it gives to value as a determining factor in reality.

Fourth, the contribution it makes to psychology and epistemology.

Fifth, the type of mathematical analysis adopted which fully represents both likeness and unlikeness, and keeps that which we are analyzing from appearing as a phenomenon made up of two reals.

Sixth, the clear field it gives to truth.

And seventh, the basis it affords for a classification of sciences.



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